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Abstract—Exploratory activities seem to be intrinsically re-
warding for children and crucial for their cognitive development.
Can a machine be endowed with such an intrinsic motivation
system? This is the question we study in this paper, presenting a
number of computational systems that try to capture this drive
towards novel or curious situations. After discussing related
research coming from developmental psychology, neuroscience,
developmental robotics, and active learning, this paper presents
the mechanism of Intelligent Adaptive Curiosity, an intrinsic
motivation system which pushes a robot towards situations in
which it maximizes its learning progress. This drive makes the
robot focus on situations which are neither too predictable nor too
unpredictable, thus permitting autonomous mental development.
The complexity of the robot’s activities autonomously increases
and complex developmental sequences self-organize without
being constructed in a supervised manner. Two experiments are
presented illustrating the stage-like organization emerging with
this mechanism. In one of them, a physical robot is placed on a
baby play mat with objects that it can learn to manipulate. Exper-
imental results show that the robot first spends time in situations
which are easy to learn, then shifts its attention progressively to
situations of increasing difficulty, avoiding situations in which
nothing can be learned. Finally, these various results are discussed
in relation to more complex forms of behavioral organization and
data coming from developmental psychology.
Index Terms—Active learning, autonomy, behavior, complexity,
curiosity, development, developmental trajectory, epigenetic
robotics, intrinsic motivation, learning, reinforcement learning,
values.
I. THE CHALLENGE OF AUTONOMOUS MENTAL DEVELOPMENT
ALL humans develop in an autonomous open-ended mannerthrough lifelong learning. So far, no robot has this ca-
pacity. Building such a robot is one of the greatest challenges
to robotics today, and is the long-term goal of the growing field
of developmental robotics [1], [2]. This paper explores a pos-
sible route towards such a goal. Our approach is inspired by de-
velopmental psychology and our ambition is to build systems
featuring some of the fundamental aspects of an infant’s devel-
opment. More precisely, two remarkable properties of human
infant development inspire us.
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A. Development is Progressive and Incremental
First of all, development involves the progressive increase of
the complexity of the activities of children with an associated in-
crease of their capabilities. Moreover, infants’ activities always
have a complexity which is well-fitted to their current capabili-
ties. Children undergo a developmental sequence during which
each new skill is acquired only when associated cognitive and
morphological structures are ready. For example, children first
learn to roll over, then to crawl and sit, and only when these
skills are operational, they begin to learn how to stand. Devel-
opment is progressive and incremental. Taking inspiration from
these observations, some roboticists argue that learning a given
task could be made much easier for a robot if it followed a de-
velopmental sequence (e.g., “learning form easy mission” [3]).
However, very often, the developmental sequence is crafted by
hand: roboticists manually build simpler versions of a complex
task and put the robot successively in versions of the task of in-
creasing complexity. For example, if they want to teach a robot
the grammar of a language, they first give it examples of very
simple sentences with few words, and progressively they add
new types of grammatical constructions and complications such
as nested subordinates [4]. This technique is useful in many
cases, but has shortcomings which limit our capacity to build
robots that develop in an open-ended manner. Indeed, this is not
practical. For each task that one wants the robot to learn, one has
to design versions of this task of increasing complexity, and one
also has to design manually a reward function dedicated to this
particular task. This might be all right if one is interested in only
one or two tasks, but a robot capable of lifelong learning should
eventually be able to perform thousands of tasks, and even if one
would engage in such a daunting task of manually designing
thousands of specific reward functions, there is another limit.
The robot is equipped with a learning machine whose learning
biases are often not intuitive: this means that it is also concep-
tually difficult most of the time to think of simpler versions of
a task that might help the robot. It is often the case that a task
that one considers to be easier for a robot might turn out in fact
to be more difficult.
B. Development is Autonomous and Active
This leads us to a second property of child development from
which we should be inspired: it is autonomous and active. Of
course, adults help by scaffolding children’s environment, but
this is just a help. Eventually, they decide by themselves what
they do, what they are interested in, and what their learning sit-
uations are. They are not forced to learn the tasks suggested by
adults, and they can invent their own. Thus, they construct by
themselves their developmental sequence. Anyone who has ever
played with an infant in its first year knows, for example, that
it is extremely difficult to get the child to play with a toy that is
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chosen by the adult if other toys and objects are around. In fact,
most often the toys that we think are adapted to them and will
please them are not the ones they prefer. They can have much
more fun and instructive play experiences with adult objects,
such as magazines, keys, or flowers. Also, most of the time, in-
fants engage in particular activities for their own sake, rather
than as steps towards solving practical problems. This is indeed
the essence of play. This suggests the existence of a kind of
intrinsic motivation system, as proposed by psychologists like
White [5], which provide internal rewards during these play ex-
periences. Such internal rewards are obviously useful, since they
are incentives to learn many skills that will potentially be readily
available later on for challenges and tasks which are not yet
foreseeable.
In order to develop in an open-ended manner, robots should
certainly be equipped with capacities for autonomous and
active development, and in particular with intrinsic motivation
systems, forming the core of a system for task-independent
learning. However, this crucial issue is still largely underinves-
tigated. The rest of this paper is organized in the following way.
Section II presents a general discussion of research related to
intrinsic motivation in the domain of psychology, neuroscience,
developmental robotics, and active learning. Section III presents
a critical review and a classification of existing intrinsic moti-
vation systems and determines key characteristics important to
permit autonomous mental development. Section IV describes
in detail the algorithm of Intelligent Adaptive Curiosity (IAC).
Section V discusses methodological issues for characterizing
the behavior and performances of such systems. Section VI
presents a first experiment using IAC with a simple simulated
robot. Section VII presents a second more complex experi-
ment involving a physical robot discovering affordances about
entities in its environment. Section VIII discusses the results
obtained in these two experiments in relation to more complex




White [5] presents an argumentation explaining why basic
forms of motivation such as those related to the need for food,
sex, or physical integrity maintenance cannot account for an
animal’s exploratory behavior, particularly in humans. He pro-
posed rather that exploratory behaviors can be by themselves
a source of rewards. Some experiments have been conducted
showing that exploration for its own sake is an activity which
is not always a secondary reinforcer, it is certainly a built-in
primary reinforcer. The literature on education and develop-
ment also stresses the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivations [6]. Psychologists have proposed possible mech-
anisms which explain the kind of exploratory behavior that,
for example, humans show. Berlyne [7] proposed that explo-
ration might be triggered and rewarded for situations which in-
clude novelty, surprise, incongruity, and complexity. He also re-
fined this idea by observing that the most rewarding situations
1The review of the psychology and neuroscience literature in this section is
partly inspired from Barto et al. ([21]).
were those with an intermediate level of novelty, between al-
ready familiar and completely new situations. This theory has
strong resonance points with the theory of flow developed by
Csikszentmihalyi [8] which argues that a crucial source of in-
ternal rewards for humans is the self-engagement in activities
which require skills just above their current level. Thus, for
Csikszentmihalyi, exploratory behavior can be explained by an
intrinsic motivation for reaching situations which represent a
learning challenge. Internal rewards are provided when a sit-
uation which was previously not mastered becomes mastered
within an amount of time and effort which must not be too
small but also not too large. Indeed, in analogy with Berlyne
[7], Csikszentmihalyi insists that the internal reward is maximal
when the challenge is not too easy but also not too difficult.
B. Neuroscience
Recent discoveries showing a convergence between patterns
of activity in the midbrain dopamine neurons and computa-
tional model of reinforcement learning have led to an important
amount of speculations about learning activities in the brain
[9]. Central to some of these models is the idea that dopamine
cells report the error in predicting expected reward delivery.
Most experiments in this domain focus on the involvement of
dopamine for predicting extrinsic (or external) reward (e.g.,
food). Yet recently, some researchers provided ground for the
idea that dopamine might also be involved in the processing
of types of intrinsic motivation associated with novelty and
exploration [10], [11]. In particular, some studies suggest that
dopamine responses could be interpreted as reporting “predic-
tion error” (and not only “reward prediction error”) [12]. These
findings support the idea that intrinsic motivation systems
could be present in the brain in some form or another and that
signals reporting prediction error could play a critical role in
this context.
C. Developmental Robotics
Given this background, a way to implement an intrinsic moti-
vation system might be to build a mechanism which can evaluate
operationally the degree of “novelty,” “surprise,” “complexity,”
or “challenge” that different situations provide from the point
of view of a learning robot, and then designing an associated re-
ward ideally being maximal when these features are in an inter-
mediate level, as proposed by Berlyne [7] and Csikszentmihalyi
[13]. Autonomous and active exploratory behavior can then be
achieved by acting so as to reach situations which maximize this
internal reward. The challenge is to find a sensible manner to
operationalize the concepts behind the words “novelty,” “com-
plexity,” “surprise,” or “challenge” which are only verbally de-
scribed and often vaguely defined in the psychology literature.
Only a few researchers have suggested such implementations,
and even fewer have tested them on real robots. Typically, they
call these systems of autonomous and active exploratory be-
havior “artificial curiosity.” Schmidhuber et al. [14], Thrun [15],
and Herrmann et al. [16] provided initial implementations of
artificial curiosity, but they did not integrate this concept within
the problematic of developmental robotics, in the sense that they
were not concerned with the emergent development sequence
and with the increase of the complexity of their machines (and
they did not use robots, but learning machines on some abstract
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problems). They were only concerned in how far artificial cu-
riosity can speed up the acquisition of knowledge. The first in-
tegrated view of developmental robotics that incorporated a pro-
posal for a novelty drive was described by Weng and colleagues
[17], [18]. Then, Kaplan and Oudeyer proposed an implemen-
tation of artificial curiosity within a developmental framework
[19], and Marshall et al., as well as Barto et al. presented varia-
tions on the novelty drive [20], [21]. As we will explain later on
in this paper, these pioneering systems have a number of limi-
tations making them impossible to use on real robots in real un-
controlled environments. Furthermore, to our knowledge, it has
not yet been shown how they could successfully lead to the au-
tonomous formation of a developmental sequence comprising
more than one stage. This means that typically they have al-
lowed for the development and emergence of one level of behav-
ioral patterns, but did not show how new levels of more complex
behavioral patterns could emerge without the intervention of a
human or a change in the environment provoked by a human.
D. Active Learning
Interestingly, the mechanisms developed in these papers
devoted to the implementation of artificial curiosity have strong
similarities with mechanisms developed in the field of statis-
tics, under the term “optimal experiment design” [22], and in
machine learning, under the term “active learning” [23], [24].
In these contexts, the problem is summarized with the question:
How to choose the next example for a learning machine in
order to minimize the number of examples necessary to achieve
a given level of performance in generalization? Or said another
way: How to choose the next example so that the gain in in-
formation for the machine learner will be maximal? A number
of techniques developed in active learning have been proven to
speed up significantly the learning of machines (e.g., [25]–[31])
and even to allow performance on generalization which are not
possible with passive learning [32]. Yet, these techniques were
developed for applications in which the mapping to be learned
was clean and typically presented as preprocessed well-pre-
pared datasets. They are also typically based on mathematical
theory like Optimal Experiment Design which assumes that
the noise is independently normally distributed [33]. On the
contrary, the domain that real robots shall investigate is the
real unconstrained world, which is a highly complicated and
“muddy” structure, as pointed out by Weng [34], full of very
different kinds of intertwined non-Gaussian inhomogeneous
noise. As a consequence, these methods cannot be used directly
in the developmental robotics domain, and there is no obvious
way to extend them in this direction. Moreover, there exists no
efficient implementation for methods like optimal experiment
design in continuous spaces, and already in discrete spaces the
computational cost is high [35].
III. EXISTING INTRINSIC MOTIVATION SYSTEMS
Existing computational approaches to intrinsic motivations
and artificial curiosity are typically based on an architecture
which comprises a machine which learns to anticipate the conse-
quences of the robot’s actions, and in which these actions are ac-
tively chosen according to some internal measures related to the
novelty or predictability of the anticipated situation. Thus, the
robots in these approaches can be described as having two mod-
ules: 1) one module implements a learning machine M which
learns to predict the sensorimotor consequences when a given
action is executed in a given sensorimotor context and 2) another
module is a meta-learning machine metaM which learns to pre-
dict the errors that machine M makes in its predictions: these
meta-predictions are then used as the basis of a measure of the
potential interestingness of a given situation. The existing ap-
proaches can be divided into three groups, according to the way
action-selection is made depending on the predictions of M and
metaM.
A. Group 1: Error Maximization
In the first group (e.g., [15], [18], [20], and [21]) robots di-
rectly use the error predicted by metaM to choose which ac-
tion to do.2 The action that they choose at each step is the one
for which metaM predicts the largest error in prediction of M.
This has shown to be efficient when the machine M has to learn
a mapping which is learnable, deterministic, and with homo-
geneous Gaussian noise [15], [17], [21], [32]. However, this
method shows limitations when used in a real uncontrolled en-
vironment. Indeed, in such a case, the mapping that M has to
learn is no longer deterministic, and the noise is vastly inhomo-
geneous. Practically, this means that a robot using this method
will, for example, be stuck by white noise or, more generally,
by situations which are inherently too complex for its learning
machinery or situations for which the causal variables are not
perceivable or observable by the robot. For example, a robot
equipped with a drive which pushes it towards situations which
are maximally unpredictable might discover and stay focused
on movement sequences like running fast against a wall, the
shock resulting in an unpredictable bounce (in principle, the
bounce is predictable since it obeys the deterministic laws of
classic mechanics but, in practice, this prediction requires the
perfect knowledge of all the physical properties of the robot
body, as well as those of the wall, which is typically far from
being the case for a robot). So, in uncontrolled environments,
a robot equipped with this intrinsic motivation system will get
stuck and display behaviors which do not lead to development
and that can sometimes even be dangerous.
B. Group 2: Progress Maximization
A second group of models tried to avoid getting stuck in the
presence of pure noise or unlearnable situations by using more
indirectly the prediction of the error of M (e.g., [16] and [19]).
In these models, a third module that we call knowledge gain
assessor (KGA) is added to the architecture. Fig. 1 shows an
illustration of these systems. This new module enhances the ca-
pabilities of the meta-machine metaM: KGA predicts the mean
error rate of M in the close future and in the next sensorimotor
contexts. KGA also stores the recent mean error rate of M in the
most recent sensorimotor contexts. The crucial point of these
models is that the interestingness of candidate situations are
evaluated using the difference between the expected mean error
rate of the predictions of M in the close future, and the mean
2Of course, we are only talking about the “novelty” drive here: their robots
are sometimes equipped with other competing drives or can respond to external
human based reward sources.
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Fig. 1. The architecture used in various models of group 2 and group 3. Here,
there is a module KGA which monitors the derivative of the errors of prediction
of M, which is the basis of an evaluation of learning progress. Some systems
(group 2) evaluate the learning progress by measuring the decrease of the error
rate of in the close past, whatever the recent situations. Some other systems
(group 3) evaluate the learning progress by measuring the decrease of the error
rate of in situations which are similar, but not necessarily close in time.
error rate in the close past. For each situation that the robot en-
counters, it is given an internal reward which is equal to the
inverse of this difference (which also corresponds to the local
derivative of the error rate curve of M). This internal reward is
positive when the error rate decreases, and negative when it in-
creases. The motivation system of the robot is then a system in
which the action chosen is that for which KGA predicts that it
will lead to the greatest decrease of the mean error rate of M.
This ensures that the robot will not stay in front of white noise
for a long time or in unlearnable situations because this does not
lead to a decrease of its errors in prediction.
However, this method has only been tested in spaces in which
the robot can do only one kind of activity, such as, for example,
moving the head and learning to predict the position of high lu-
minance points [19]. However, the ideal characteristic of a de-
velopmental robot is that it may engage in various kinds of ac-
tivities, such as learning to walk, learning to grip things in its
hand, learning to track a visual target, learning to catch the at-
tention of other social beings, learning to vocalize, etc. In such
cases, the robot can typically switch rapidly from one activity to
the other, for example, making a trial at gripping an object that
it sees and suddenly shifting to trying to track the movement
of another being in its environment. In such a case, measuring
the evolution in time of its performance in predicting what hap-
pens will lead to a measure which is hardly interpretable. In-
deed, using the method we described in the last paragraph will
make the robot compare its error rate in anticipation while it is
trying to grip an object, with its error rate in anticipation while
it is trying to anticipate the reaction of the other being when he
vocalizes, if these two kinds of activities are sequenced. Thus,
it will often lead the robot to compare its performances between
activities which are of a different kind, which has no obvious
meaning. And indeed, using this direct measure of the decrease
in the error rate in prediction will provide the robot with in-
ternal rewards when shifting from an activity with a high mean
error rate to activities with a lower mean error rate, which can be
higher than the rewards corresponding to an effective increase
of the skills of the robot in one of the activities. This will push
the robot towards instable behavior, in which it focuses on the
sudden shifts between different kinds of activities rather than
concentrate on the actual activities.
C. Group 3: Similarity-Based Progress Maximization
Changes are needed so that methods based on the decrease
of the error rate in prediction can still work in a realistic com-
plex developmental robotics setup. It is necessary that the robot
monitors the evolution of its error rate in prediction in situations
which are of the same kind. It will no longer compare its cur-
rent error rate with its error rate in the recent past, whatever the
current situation and the situation in the close past are. The sim-
ilarity between situations must be taken into account. Building
a system which can do that correctly represents a big challenge.
Indeed, a developmental robot will not be given an innate mech-
anism with a preprogrammed set of kinds of situations and a
mechanism for categorizing each particular situation into one
of these kinds. A developmental robot has to be able to build by
itself a measure of the similarity of situations and ultimately an
organization of the infinite continuous space of particular situ-
ations into higher level categories (or kinds) of situations. For
example, a developmental robot does not know initially that on
the one hand, there can be the “gripping objects” kind of ac-
tivity and, on the other hand, the “vocalizing to others” kind of
activity. Initially, the world is just a continuous stream of sen-
sations and low-level motor commands for the robot.
A related approach, but with an active learning point of view
rather than a developmental robotics point of view, was pro-
posed in [14] and presented an implementation of the idea of
evaluating the learning progress by monitoring the evolution
of the error rate in similar situations. The implementation de-
scribed was tested for discrete environments like a two-dimen-
sional grid virtual world on which an agent could move and do
one of four discrete actions. The similarity of two situations was
evaluated by a binary function stating whether they correspond
exactly to the same discrete state or not. From an active learning
point of view, it was shown that in this case the system can sig-
nificantly speed up the learning, even if some parts of the space
are pure noise. This system was not studied under the develop-
mental robotics point of view: it was not shown whether this
allowed for a self-organization of the behavior of the robot into
a developmental sequence featuring clearly several stages of in-
creasing complexity. Moreover, because the system was only
tested on a discrete simulated environment, it is difficult to gen-
eralize the results to real-world conditions with continuous en-
vironment and action spaces, and where two situations are never
numerically exactly the same. Nevertheless, this paper suggests
a possible manner to use this method in continuous spaces. It is
based on the use of a learning machine such as a feedforward
neural network which takes as input a particular situation and
predicts the error associated with the anticipation of the conse-
quence of a given action in this situation. This measure is then
used in a formula to evaluate the learning progress. Thanks to
the generalization properties of a machine like a neural network,
the author claims that the mechanism will correctly generalize
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the evaluation of learning progress from one situation to similar
situations. However, it is not clear how this will work in practice
since the error function, and thus the learning progress function,
are locally highly nonstationary. This provokes a risk of over-
generalization. Another limit of this work resides within the par-
ticular formula that is used to evaluate the learning progress as-
sociated with a candidate situation, which consists in making the
difference between the error in the anticipation of this situation
before it has been experienced and the error in the anticipation
of exactly the same situation after it has been experienced. On
the one hand, this can only work for a learning machine with a
low learning rate, as pointed out by the author, and will not work
with, for example, one-shot learning of memory-based methods.
On the other hand, considering the state of the learning machine
just before and just after one single experience can possibly be
sensitive to stochastic fluctuations.
The next section will present a system which provides
another implementation of the idea of evaluating the learning
progress by comparing similar situations. This system is made
to work in continuous spaces, and we will actually show that
this system works both in a virtual robot setup and in a real
robotic setup with continuous motor and/or perceptual spaces.
One of its crucial features is that it introduces a mechanism of
situation categorization, which splits the space incrementally
and autonomously into different regions, which correspond to
different kinds of activities from the point of view of the robot.
This allows us to compare the similarity of two situations not
directly based on their intrinsic metric distance, but on their
belonging to a given situation category. Another feature is the
fact that we monitor in each of these regions the evolution of the
error rate in prediction for an extended period of time, which
allows us to use smoothing procedures and avoid problems due
to stochastic fluctuations. The “regional” evaluation of simi-
larity combined with the smoothing of the error rate curve is a
way to cope with the nonstationarity of the learning progress
function. Another feature is that it makes no presupposition
on the learning rate of the learning machines, and thus can be
used with one-shot learning methods like nearest-neighbors
algorithms, as well as with slowly learning neural networks for
example.
IV. INTELLIGENT ADAPTIVE CURIOSITY (IAC)
The system described in this section is called Intelligent
Adaptive Curiosity (IAC).
• It is a motivation, or drive, in the same sense that food level
maintenance or heat maintenance are drives, but instead of
being about the maintenance of a physical variable, the IAC
drive is about the maintenance of an abstract dynamic cog-
nitive variable: the learning progress, which must be kept
maximal. This definition makes it an intrinsic motivation.
• It is called curiosity because maximizing the learning
progress pushes (as a side effect) the robot towards novel
situations in which things can be learned.
• It is adaptive because the situations that are attractive
change over time, indeed, once something is learned, it
will not provide learning progress anymore.
• It is called intelligent because it keeps, as a side effect, the
robot away both from situations which are too predictable
and from situations which are too unpredictable (i.e., the
edge of order and chaos in the cognitive dynamics). Indeed,
thanks to the fact that one evaluates the learning progress
by comparing situations which are similar and in a “re-
gional” manner, the pathologic behaviors that we described
in the previous section are avoided.
We will now describe how this system can be fully imple-
mented. This implementation can be varied in many ways, for
example, by replacing the implementation of the learning ma-
chines M, metaM, and KGA. The one we provide is basic and
was developed for its practical efficiency. Also, it will be clear
to the reader that in an efficient implementation, the machines
M, metaM, and KGA are not easily separable (keeping them
separate entities in the previous paragraphs was for reasons of
keeping the explanation easier to understand).
A. Summary
IAC relies on a memory which stores all the experiences en-
countered by the robot in the form of vector exemplars. There is
a mechanism which incrementally splits the sensorimotor space
into regions, based on these exemplars. Each region is character-
ized by its exclusive set of exemplars and is also associated with
its own learning machine, which we call an expert. This expert
is trained with the exemplars available in its region. When a pre-
diction corresponding to a given situation has to be made by the
robot, then the expert of the region which covers this situation
is picked up and used for the prediction. Each time an expert
makes a prediction associated with an action which is actually
executed, its error in prediction is measured and stored in a list
which is associated to its region. Each region has its own list.
This list is used to evaluate the potential learning progress that
can be gained by going in a situation covered by its associated
region. This is made based on a smoothing of the list of errors,
and on an extrapolation of the derivative. When in a given situ-
ation, the robot creates a list of possible actions and chooses the
one for which it evaluates, it will lead to a situation with max-
imal expected learning progress.3
B. Sensorimotor Apparatus
The robot has a number of real-valued sensors , which
are here summarized by the vector . Its actions are con-
trolled by the setting of the real number values of a set of ac-
tion/motor parameters , which we summarize using the
vector . These action parameters can potentially be very
low level (for example, the speed of motors) or of a higher level
(for example, the control parameters of motor primitives such as
the biting or bashing movement that we will describe in the sec-
tion devoted to the “Playground Experiment”). We denote the
sensorimotor context as the vector which summarizes
the values of all the sensors and the action parameters at time
3A variant of this system is the use of only one monolithic learning system,
keeping the mechanism of region construction by incremental space splitting.
In this case, for each prediction of the single learning system, its error is stored
in the list corresponding to the region covering the associated situation. The
evaluation of the expected learning progress of a candidate situation is the same
as in the system presented here. However, we prefer to use one learning system
per region in order to avoid forgetting problems which are typical of monolithic
learning machines when used in a lifelong learning setup with various kinds of
situations.
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[it is the concatenation of and ]. In all that follows,
there is an internal clock in the robot which discretizes the time,
and new actions are chosen at every time step.
C. Regions
IAC equips the robot with a memory of all the exemplars
which have been encountered by the robot.
There is a mechanism which incrementally splits the sensori-
motor space into regions, based on these exemplars. Each region
is characterized by its exclusive set of exemplars. At the begin-
ning, there is only one region . Then, when a criterion
is met, this region is split into two regions. This is done recur-
sively. A very simple criterion can be used: when the number
of exemplars associated with the region is above a threshold
, then split. This criterion allows us to guarantee a low
number of exemplars in each leaf, which renders the prediction
and learning mechanism that we will describe computationally
efficient in the next paragraphs. The counterpart is that it will
lead to systems with many regions which are not easily inter-
pretable from a human point of view.
When a splitting has been decided, then another criterion
must be used to find out how the region will be split. Again, the
choice of this criterion was made so that it is computationally
and experimentally efficient. The idea is that we split the set
of exemplars into two sets so that the sum of the variances of
components of the exemplars of each set, weighted by
the number of exemplars of each set, is minimal. Let us explain
this mathematically. Let us denote
the set of exemplars possessed by region . Let us denote a
cutting dimension and an associated cutting value. Then, the
split of into and is done by choosing a and a
such that (criterion ):
• all the exemplars of have the th
component of their smaller than ;
• all the exemplars of have the th
component of their greater than ;
• the quantity
is minimal, where
where is a set of vectors and denotes the cardinal of
.
Then, recursively and for each region, if the criterion is met,
the region is split into two regions with the criterion . This is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
Each region stores all the cutting dimensions and the cutting
values that were used in its generation, as well as in the gen-
eration of its parent experts. As a consequence, when a predic-
tion has to be made of the consequences of , it is easy to
find out the expert specialist for this case: it is the one for which
satisfies all the cutting tests (and there is always a single
expert, which corresponds to each ).
D. Experts
To each region , there is an associated learning machine
, called an expert. A given expert is responsible for the
prediction of given when is a situation
which is covered by its associated region . Each expert
is trained on the set of exemplars which is possessed by its as-
sociated region . An expert can be a neural-network, a sup-
port-vector machine, or a Bayesian machine for example. For
all learning machines whose training can be incremental, such
as neural networks, support-vector machines, or memory-based
methods, then the system is efficient since it is not necessary to
retrain each expert on all the exemplars of each region, but just
to update one single expert by feeding the new exemplar to it.
Still, when a region is split, one cannot use directly the “parent”
expert to implement the two children experts. Each child ex-
pert is typically a fresh expert retrained with the exemplars that
its associated region has inherited. The computational cost as-
sociated with this is limited due to the fact that the number of
exemplars is never higher than as guaranteed by the
criterion.4
E. Evaluation of Learning Progress
This partition of the sensorimotor space into different regions
is the basis of our regional evaluation of learning progress. Each
time an action is executed by the robot in a given sensorimotor
context covered by the region , the robot can mea-
sure the discrepancy between the sensory state that the
expert predicted and the actual sensory state that it
4Even computationally demanding learning machines such as nonlinear sup-
port vector machines require only a few dozens milliseconds on a standard
computer to be trained with 250 examples, even if these examples have sev-
eral hundred dimensions ([36]). In the experiments described in the next sec-
tions, we use a very simple learning algorithm for implementing the expert,
the nearest-neighbors algorithm. In this case, there is not even a need for re-
training the expert, since the expert is the set of exemplars. In general, the use
of the nearest-neighbor algorithm is computationally costly when used at the
prediction stage, since it requires as many computations of distances as there
are exemplars. Again, the criterion guarantees that the number of exem-
plars is always low and allows for a fast computation of the closest exemplar.
It is also interesting to note that if one would use a monolithic learning system
with only one global expert, which is a variation of IAC mentioned earlier, then
the use of the nearest-neighbors algorithm would soon become computation-
ally very expensive since a lifelong learning robot can accumulate millions of
exemplars. On the contrary, using local experts to which access is computed
with a tree of cheap numerical comparisons (see Fig. 2) allows us to compute
approximately correct global nearest neighbors with a logarithmic complexity
( ) rather than with a linear complexity ( ). In fact, using a tree
structure with local experts not only allows to speed up the nearest-neighbors
algorithm, but it also allows to increase the performances in generalization. In
practice, this means that the system we present in this paper, when used, for ex-
ample, with the nearest-neighbors algorithm, can update itself, as well as make
predictions when it already possesses 3 000 000 exemplars in a few milliseconds
on a personal computer, since in this case it requires about 17 scalar compar-
isons (depth of the corresponding balanced tree) and 250 distance computation
between points. Admittedly, this requires a lot of memory, but it is interesting
to note that the collection of 3 000 000 exemplars composed of, for example, 20
dimensions, which would take approximately 34 days in the case of the robots
presented in the “Playground Experiment” section, would require about 230 Mb
in memory, which is much less than the capacity of most handheld computers
nowadays.
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Fig. 2. The sensorimotor space is iteratively and recursively split into sub-
spaces, which we call “regions.” Each region is responsible for monitoring
the evolution of the error rate in the anticipation of the consequences of the
robot’s actions if the associated contexts are covered by this region. This list of
regional error rates is used for learning progress evaluation.
measures. This provides a measure of the error of the prediction
of at time
This squared error is added to the list of past squared errors of
, which are stored in association to the region . We denote
this list
Note that here denotes a time which is specific to the expert,
and not to the robot, this means that might correspond
to the error made by the expert in an action performed at
for the robot, and that no actions corresponding to this
expert were performed by the robot since that time. These lists
associated to the regions are then used to evaluate the learning
progress that has been achieved after an action has been
achieved in sensory context , leading to a sensory context
. The learning progress that has been achieved through
the transition from the context, covered by region ,
to the context with a perceptual vector is computed as
the smoothed derivative of the error curve of corresponding
to the acquisition of its recent exemplars. Mathematically, the
computation involves two steps.
• The mean error rate in prediction is computed at and
where is a time window parameter typically equal to 15,
and a smoothing parameter typically equal to 25.
• The actual decrease in the mean error rate in prediction is
defined as
(1)
We can then define the actual learning progress as
(2)
Eventually, when a region is split into two regions, both new
regions inherit the list of past errors from their parent region,
which allows them to make evaluation of learning progress right
from the time of their creation.
F. Action Selection
We now have in place a prediction machinery and a mecha-
nism which provides an internal reward (positive or negative)
each time an action is performed in a given context, depending
on how much learning progress has been achieved.5 The goal of
the intrinsically motivated robot is then to maximize the amount
of internal reward that it gets. Mathematically, this can be for-
mulated as the maximization of future expected rewards (i.e.,
maximization of the return), that is
where ( ) is the discount factor, which assigns less
weigh on the reward expected in the far future.
This formulation corresponds to a reinforcement learning
problem formulation [37], and thus the techniques developed
in this field can be used to implement an action selection mech-
anism which will allow the robot to maximize future expected
rewards efficiently. Indeed, in reinforcement learning models,
a controller chooses which action to take in a context based
on rewards provided by a critic. Traditional models view the
critic as being external to the agent. Such situations correspond
to extrinsically motivated forms of learning. But the critic can
as well be part of the agent itself (as clearly argued by Sutton
and Barto [37, pp. 51–54]). As a consequence, the algorithm
described in this section can be interpreted as a critic capable
of producing internal rewards in order to guide the agent
in its development. Thus, any existing reinforcement learning
technique can be associated with the IAC drive.
One simple example would be to use Watkins’ -learning
[38]. The algorithm learns an action-value function , es-
timating how good it is to perform a given action ( in
our context) in a given contextual state ( in our context).
“Good” actions are expected to lead to more future rewards (e.g.,
more future learning progress in our context). The algorithm can
be described in the following procedural form:
• Initialize with small random uniform values;
• Repeat
— In situation , choose using a policy derived from .
For instance, choose that maximize in most cases
5To integrate reward resulting from learning progress with other kinds of (pos-
sibly extrinsic) rewards, a weighted sum can be used. A parameter specifies
the relative weight of each reward type
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but every once in a while, with a probability instead
select an action at random, uniformly (this is called an
-greedy action selection rule [37]);




where the parameter is the learning rate controlling how fast
the action-value function is updated by experience. Of course,
all the complex issues traditionally encountered in reinforce-
ment learning like tradeoff between exploration and exploitation
stay crucial for systems using internal rewards based on intrinsic
motivation.
The purpose of this paper is to focus on the study and under-
standing of the learning progress definition that we presented.
Using a complex reinforcement machinery brings complexity
and biases which are specific to a particular method, especially
concerning the way they process delayed rewards. While using
such a method with intrinsic motivation systems will surely be
useful in the future, and is, in fact, an entire subject of research
as illustrated by the work of Barto et al. [21] who have studied
the use of sophisticated reinforcement learning techniques on a
simple novelty-based intrinsic motivation system, we will now
make a simplification which will allow us not to use such sophis-
ticated reinforcement learning methods so that the results we
will present in the experiment section can be interpreted more
easily. Indeed, this is a necessary step since our intrinsic moti-
vation system involves a nontrivial measure of learning progress
which must be carefully understood. This simplification consists
in having the system try to maximize only the expected reward
it will receive at , i.e., . This permits us to avoid
problems related to delayed rewards and it makes it possible to
use a simple prediction system which can predict , and so
evaluate , and then be used in a straightforward ac-
tion selection loop. The method we use to evaluate
given a sensory context and a candidate action , con-
stituting a candidate sensorimotor context covered by
region , is straightforward but revealed to be efficient, it is
equal to the learning progress that was achieved in with the
acquisition of its recent exemplars, i.e.,
(3)
where is the time corresponding to the last time region
and expert processed a new exemplar.
Based on this predictive mechanism, one can deduce a
straightforward mechanism which manages action selection in
order to maximize the expected reward at .
• In a given sensory context , the robot makes a list of the
possible actions which it can do; if this list is infinite,
which is often the case since we work in continuous action
spaces, a sample of candidate actions is generated.
• Each of these candidate actions associated with the
context makes a candidate vector for which the
robot finds out the corresponding region ; then the for-
mula we just described is used to evaluate the expected
learning progress that might be the result of
executing the candidate action .
• The action for which the system expects the maximal
learning progress is chosen and executed except in some
cases when a random action is selected ( – greedy action
selection rule). In the following experiments is typically
0.35.
• After the action has been executed and the consequences
measured, the system is updated.
V. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES FOR MEASURING
BEHAVIORAL COMPLEXITY
From a developmental robotics point of view, intrinsic moti-
vation systems are interesting as a way to achieve a continuous
increase in behavioral complexity. This raises issues for finding
adequate methods to evaluate such systems. Evaluation based
on performance level for a set of predefined tasks is the most
common way to assess the learning progress of adaptive robots.
However, as intrinsic motivation systems are designed to result
in task-independent autonomous development, using an evalu-
ation paradigm coming from task-oriented design is not well
adapted. Moreover, such evaluation methods are associated with
the tempting anthropomorphic bias to evaluate how well robots
manage to learn the tasks that humans can learn.
The issue is therefore to evaluate the increase of a robot’s
behavioral complexity during a developmental sequence. It is
important to stress that there is not a single objective way for
assessing the increase of complexity of a system. Complexity is
always related to a given observer [39]. Three complementary
approaches can be envisioned.
• First, it is possible to evaluate the increase in complexity
from the robot’s point of view. This means measuring
internal variables that account for the open-endedness
of its development (e.g., cumulative amount of learning
progress, evolution of the performance of anticipations,
and evolution of the way sensorimotor situations are
categorized and represented).
• Second, behavioral complexity can be measured from an
external point of view based on various complexity mea-
sures (information-theoretical measures such as the ones
presented by Sporns and Pegors could be used in that re-
spect [40]). The increase in behavioral complexity is as-
sessed by pattern changes in these measures.
• Finally, the experimenter can adopt a method more similar
to one used by a psychologist, interpreting developmental
sequences as a set of successive stages. The stages of de-
velopment introduced by Piaget are among the most fa-
mous examples of such qualitative descriptions [41]. Each
transition between stages corresponds to a broad change
in the structure or logic of children’s intelligence and/or
behavior. Based on clinical observations, dialogues, and
small-scale experiments, the psychologist tries to interpret
the signs of an internal reorganization. Therefore, the issue
is to map external observations to a series of preexisting
interpretative models. Transitions are most of the time pro-
gressive and cutting a developmental sequences into sharp
division is usually difficult.
The following experiments will illustrate how a combination
of some of these methods can be used to assess the development
of a robot with an intrinsic motivation system.
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Fig. 3. The robotic setup. A two-wheeled robot moves in a room and there
is also an intelligent toy (represented by a sphere) which moves according to
the sounds that the robot produces. The robot perceives the distance between
himself and the toy. The robot tries to predict this distance after performing a
given action, which is a setting of (left wheel speed, right wheel speed, sound
frequency). He chooses the actions for which it predicts its learning progress
will be maximal.
VI. A FIRST EXPERIMENT WITH A SIMPLE
SIMULATED ROBOT
We present here a robotic simulation implemented with the
Webots simulation software [42]. The purpose of this initial
simulated experiment is to show and understand in detail the
working of the IAC system in a continuous sensorimotor envi-
ronment in which there are parts which are clearly inhomoge-
neous from the learning point of view: there is a part of the space
which is easy to learn, a part of the space which contains more
complex structures which can be learned, and a part of the space
which is unlearnable.
A. Motor Control
The robot is a box with two wheels (see Fig. 3). Each wheel
can be controlled by setting its speed (real number between
and 1). The robot can also emit a sound of a particular frequency.
The action space is three-dimensional and continuous, and de-
ciding for an action consists in setting the values of the motor
vector
where is the speed of the motor on the left, the speed of the
motor on the right, and the frequency of the emitted sound.
The robot moves in a room. There is a toy in this room that can
also move. This toy moves randomly if the sound emitted by the
robot has a frequency belonging to zone . It stops
moving if the sound is in zone . The toy jumps
into the robot if the sound is in zone .
B. Perception
The robot perceives the distance to the toy with simulated
infrared sensors, so its sensory vector is one-dimensional
where is the distance between the robot and the toy at time .
C. Action Perception Loop
As a consequence, the mapping that the robot is trying to learn
is
Using the IAC algorithm, the robot will thus act in order
to maximize its learning progress in terms of predicting the
next toy distance. The robot has no prior knowledge and, in
particular, it does not know that there is a qualitative differ-
ence between setting the speed of the wheels and setting the
sound frequency (for the robot, these are unlabeled motor chan-
nels). It does not know that there are three zones of the sensory-
motor space of different complexities: the zone corresponding
to sounds in , where the distance to the toy cannot be pre-
dicted since its movement is random; the zone with sounds in
, where the distance to the toy is easy to learn and predict (it is
always 0 plus a noise component because Webots simulates the
imprecision of sensors and actuators); and the zone with sounds
in , where the distance to the toy is predictable (and learnable)
but complex and dependant of the setting of the wheel speeds.
However, we will now show that the robot manages to au-
tonomously discover these three zones, evaluate their relative
complexity, and exploit this information for organizing its own
behavior.
D. Results
First of all, one can study the behavior of the robot during
a simulation from an external point of view. A way to do that
is to use our knowledge of the structure of the environment in
which the robot lives and build corresponding relevant measures
characterizing the behavior of the robot within a given period of
time: 1) the frequency of situations in which it emits a sound
within ; 2) the frequency of situations in which it emits a
sound within ; and 3) the frequency of situations in which
it emits a sound within . Fig. 4 shows the evolution of these
measures for 5000 time steps. Several phases can be identified.
• Stage 1: Initially, the robot produces all kinds of actions
with a uniform probability, and in particular produces
sounds with frequencies within the whole [0, 1] spectrum.
• Stage 2: After the first 250 first steps, the robot concen-
trates on emitting sounds within , and emits sounds with
frequencies within or very rarely.
• Stage 3: There is then a phase within which the robot con-
centrates on emitting sounds within , and emits sounds
with frequencies within or very rarely.
This shows that the robot consistently avoids the situations
in which nothing can be learned, begins by easy situations, and
then shifts autonomously to a more complex situation.
We can now study what happens from the robot’s point of
view. Fig. 5 shows a representation of the successive values of
for all the regions constructed by the robot at a given
time . As the time is here defined internally as the number of
action selection loops, it corresponds to the number of actions
that have been chosen by the robot, and to the number of ex-
emplars that have been provided to it. The graph appears as a
tree, which corresponds to the successive splitting of the space
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the percentage of time spent in: 1) situations in which the emitted sounds have a frequency within (continuous line); 2) situations in which
the emitted sounds have a frequency within (dotted line); and 3) situations in which the emitted sounds have a frequency within (dashed line).
Fig. 5. Evolution of the successive values of for all the regions
constructed by the robot.
into regions. For example, between and , there is
only one curve because during that time there was only one re-
gion . This initial curve is the sequence of values of .
Then, because the criterion was met, this region splits into
two regions and , which also splits the curve into two
curves, one corresponding to the successive values of
and the other corresponding to the successive values of .
Then, the curves split again when their associated regions split,
etc.
By looking at the trace of the simulation and the definitions
of the regions associated to each curve, it is possible to figure
out what the regions which are iteratively created look like. It
appears that the first split appearing at corresponds to a
split between situations in which the robot emits sounds with a
frequency within ( on the graph), and situations in which
the robot emits sounds with a frequency within or ( on
the graph). To be exact, the system made a split by using the
third dimension of , i.e., the frequency , and using the
cut value 0.35, which means that the region includes pos-
sibly a small portion of situations with a sound in , since
begins at 0.34.6 Now, we observe that the curve corresponding
to shows a sharp decrease in its error rate, while the curve
in shows an increase in the error rate. This explains why
during this period, the robot will emit sounds with frequencies
within : indeed, this corresponds to situations which are in-
ternally evaluated as providing the highest amount of learning
progress at this time of its development. Nevertheless, as the
robot sometimes does some random actions, the region ac-
cumulates some more exemplars, and we observe that around
, it splits into and . Looking at the trace shows
that corresponds to situations with sounds within and
with sounds within . We observe that the error rate continues
to increase until a plateau is reached for , while it begins
to decrease for . During that time, the robot finally predicts
6This also shows that the splitting criteria and that we presented op-
erate efficiently, since the system finds out by itself that this is the dimension
which is the most relevant for cutting the space at the beginning of the develop-
ment
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perfectly well situations with sounds with a frequency within
and associated with (it still takes a while because of the
noise), and a plateau close to 0 in the error rate is reached. This is
why at some point the robot shifts to situations in which it emits
sounds with frequencies within , which are situations which
are a higher source of learning progress at this point in its devel-
opment. The robot then tries to vary its motor speeds within this
subspace with sounds with frequencies in , learning to predict
how these speeds affect the distance to the toy. The accumula-
tion of new exemplars pushes the robot to split into more
regions, which is a refinement of its categorization of this kind
of situations. Now, the system splits the space using the and
dimensions, and the robot figures out how to efficiently explore
the subspace of situations with sounds with frequencies within
, in terms of learning progress.
E. Performance in Terms of Active Learning
The efficiency of the exploration of this subspace of situations
with sounds in , where interesting things can be learned, can
be evaluated if we reformulate IAC within the problematics of
active learning. This will also allow us to evaluate the efficiency
of the IAC algorithm from the point of view of active learning.
Indeed, as we explained in the introduction, in the field of ma-
chine learning and data mining, the search for methods which
allow us to reduce the number of examples needed to achieve
a given level of performance in generalization for a machine
which learns an input–output mapping, is of growing interest
(here, the input is and the output is ). While
IAC was designed as a system for driving the development of
a robot, it can also be considered as a pure active learning al-
gorithm, and in this respect, it is interesting to evaluate how it
compares with standard existing algorithms. Thus, we will use
two reference algorithms to evaluate the performance of IAC.
The first one follows the most common idea in the field of ac-
tive learning [15], [24], [25]. The next action (also called query
or experiment depending on the authors) is chosen so that it cor-
responds an input–output pair for which the machine evaluates
that its prediction for this pair will be maximally false as com-
pared with its prediction for possible other pairs. It is easy to
adapt this idea using the same algorithmic architecture than the
one used for IAC: when the robot has to decide for an action in
a given context, it makes the list of possible actions within that
context, then for each of them evaluates the expected error in
prediction using the quantity defined earlier, and fi-
nally chooses the action for which this quantity is maximal. Ev-
erything else is equal. We will call this algorithm “MAX.” The
second reference algorithm that we use is the “RANDOM” al-
gorithm, which simply consists in random action selection (and
so is not an active learning algorithm, but serves as a baseline).
IAC, MAX, and RANDOM will be compared in terms of their
performance in generalization in predicting the consequence of
actions during which a sound within the zone is emitted. This
means that we will evaluate each of them in the part which we
know is interesting. However, the whole space with all ranges of
frequencies is made available to the robot, which does not know
initially that there is a particular zone where it can actually learn
nontrivial things.
Fig. 6. Evolution of the performance in generalization (mean-squared predic-
tion error) in situations in which the frequency of the emitted sound is within
and, respectively, for the MAX algorithm (continuous line), the IAC algorithm
(long dashes line), and the RANDOM algorithm (small dashes lines). This al-
lows us to compare how much the robot has learned of the interesting situations
after a given number of performed actions, when it uses a given action selection
algorithm.
For a given simulation using a given algorithm among IAC,
MAX, and RANDOM, we evaluate every 100 actions of perfor-
mance in generalization of the current learning machine. To do
this, we initially made a simulation with random action selec-
tion and collected a database of input–output by storing the ex-
perienced couples for which the action in-
cluded an emission of a sound with a frequency within . This
provides an independent test set which we used to test the ca-
pacity of prediction that the robot acquired at a given time in its
development. For this test which is done every 100 actions, we
freeze the learning machine and make it predict the output cor-
responding to all the inputs in the test database. The freezing en-
sures that the machine does not learn while it is tested. The pre-
diction accuracy is measured using the mean-squared error over
the database. After evaluating the performance, we unfreezed
the system until the next evaluation.
Fig. 6 shows typical resulting curves of the three algorithms.
We see that initially, the algorithm which learns fastest is the
RANDOM algorithm. This is normal since MAX spends times
in uninteresting situations, and IAC at the beginning spends time
in the easy situation, so RANDOM is the algorithm which pro-
vides initially the highest amount of examples related to the
production of the sounds with frequencies within (33% of
examples are of this type in this case). Then, after 3000 ac-
tions, the curve corresponding to the IAC algorithm suddenly
drops down, this corresponds to the shift of attention of the
robot towards situations with sounds with frequencies within
. Now, this robot spends 85% of its time in situations with
sound with frequency within (and not 100% due to the 0.15
probability to do a random action). Quickly, the curve gets sig-
nificantly below the RANDOM algorithm, and reaches a low
plateau around 5000 actions (where the mean prediction error
stays around 0.09). The RANDOM curve reaches a low plateau
much later (this is not represented on this curve) after about
11 000 actions. The value of the plateau, interestingly, is higher
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
12 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION
than with the IAC algorithm, it is 0.096. We repeated the experi-
ments 100 times in order to see whether this had some statistical
significance. In each simulation, we measured the time where
a plateau was reached (defined as 500 successive points, where
the mean-squared error has a variance smaller than 0.0001), and
what the mean-squared error was at that time. It turned out that
the plateau was reached at in average for IAC, with
a standard deviation of 452, and at in average with
a standard deviation of 561 for RANDOM. The mean-squared
error was in average with a standard deviation of 0.009
for IAC, and was with a standard deviation of 0.004
for RANDOM. As a consequence, we can say consistently that
IAC allows the robot to learn the interesting part of the map-
ping about 2.6 times faster and with a higher performance in
generalization than the RANDOM algorithm. This increase of
the performances in generalization is similar to what has already
been described in other active learning algorithms [32].
F. Summary
With this experiment, we have shown a first embodiment of
the IAC system within a simulated robot. This has allowed us
to show how IAC could manage the development of the robot
in an inhomogeneous sensorimotor environment with parts
which were not learnable by the robot. We have shown how the
robot consistently avoided this zone of unlearnability and, on
the other hand, explored autonomously sensorimotor situations
of increasing complexity. This simple setup also allowed us to
detail the evolution of the internal structures built by the IAC
system. We could explain, for example, the progressive forma-
tion of regions with varying potentials for learning progress.
Finally, this setup not only allowed us to show the interest of
IAC as an intrinsic motivation system which could self-orga-
nize the behavior of a robot in a developmental manner, but it
also showed that IAC is an efficient and robust active learning
system. Indeed, we proved that it was faster than both the
RANDOM algorithm and traditional active learning methods
which are not suited to mappings with strong inhomogeneities
and even unlearnable parts.
However, the simplicity of this setup did not allow us to show
how a developmental sequence with more than one transition
could self-organize autonomously (here, there was only a tran-
sition between a stage in which the robot focused on actions
with sounds in , and then a stage in which the robot focused
on actions with sounds in ). We are now going to present a
more complex experiment in which we will show that multiple
sequential levels of self-organization of the behavior of the robot
can happen.
VII. THE PLAYGROUND EXPERIMENT: THE DISCOVERY OF
SENSORIMOTOR AFFORDANCES
This new experimental setup is called “The Playground
Experiment.” This involves a physical robot as well as a more
complex sensorimotor system and environment. We use a Sony
AIBO robot which is put on a baby play mat with various
toys that can be bitten, bashed, or simply visually detected
(see Fig. 7). The environment is very similar to the ones in
Fig. 7. The playground experiment setup.
which two- or three-month old children learn their first sen-
sorimotor skills, although the sensorimotor apparatus of the
robot here is much more limited. We have developed a web site
which presents pictures and videos of this setup: http://play-
ground.csl.sony.fr/.
A. Motor Control
The robot is equipped initially only with simple motor primi-
tives. In particular, it is not able to walk around. There are three
basic motor primitives: turning the head, bashing, and crouch
biting. Each of them is controlled by a number of real number
parameters, which are the action parameters that the robot con-
trols. The “turning head” primitive is controlled with the pan
and tilt parameters of the robot’s head. The “bashing” primitive
is controlled with the strength and the angle of the leg move-
ment (a lower level automatic mechanism takes care of setting
the individual motors controlling the leg). The “crouch biting”
primitive is controlled by the depth of crouching (and the robot
crouches in the direction in which it is looking at, which is deter-
mined by the pan and tilt parameters). To summarize, choosing
an action consists in setting the parameters of the five-dimen-
sional continuous vector
where is the pan of the head, the tilt of the head,
the strength of the bashing primitive, the angle of the
bashing primitive, and the depth of the crouching of the
robot for the biting motor primitive. All values are real
numbers between 0 and 1, plus the value which is a con-
vention used for not using a motor primitive, for example,
corresponds to the combina-
tion of turning the head with parameters and
with the biting primitive with the parameter but with
no bashing movement.
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B. Perception
The robot is equipped with three high-level sensors based on
lower level sensors. The sensory vector is thus three-di-
mensional
where:
• is the binary value of an object visual detection sensor:
It takes the value 1 when the robot sees an object, and 0
in the other case. In the playground, we use simple visual
tags that we stick on the toys and are easy to detect from the
image processing point of view. These tags are black and
white patterns similar to the Cybercode system developed
by Rekimoto ([43]).
• is the binary value of a biting sensor: It takes the value 1
when the robot has something in its mouth and 0 otherwise.
We use the cheek sensor of the AIBO.
• is the binary value of an oscillation sensor: It takes the
value 1 when the robot detects that there is something os-
cillating in front of it, and 0, otherwise. We use the infrared
distance sensor of the AIBO to implement this high-level
sensor. This sensor can detect, for example, when there is
an object that has been bashed in the direction of the robot’s
gaze, but can also detect events due to human walking
around the playground (we do not control the environ-
ment).
It is crucial to note that initially the robot knows nothing about
sensorimotor affordances. For example, it does not know that the
values of the object visual detection sensor are correlated with
the values of its pan and tilt. It does not know that the values
of the biting or object oscillation sensors can become 1 only
when biting or bashing actions are performed towards an object.
It does not know that some objects are more prone to provoke
changes in the values of the and sensors when only cer-
tain kinds of actions are performed in their direction. It does not
know, for example, that to get a change in the value of the os-
cillation sensor, bashing in the correct direction is not enough,
because it also needs to look in the right direction (since its os-
cillation sensors are on the front of its head). These remarks
allow us to understand easily that a random strategy will not be
efficient in this environment. If the robot would do random ac-
tion selection, in a vast majority of cases, nothing would happen
(especially for the and sensors).
C. The Action Perception Loop
To summarize, the mapping that the robot has to learn is
The robot is equipped with the IAC system, and thus chooses
its actions according to the potential learning progress that it
can provide to one of its experts. In this experiment, the ac-
tion perception loop is rather long. When the robot chooses and
executes an action, it waits until all its motor primitives have
finished their execution, which lasts approximately one second,
before choosing the next action. This is how the internal clock
for the IAC system is implemented. On the one hand, this al-
lows the robot to make all the measures necessary for deter-
mining adequate values of . On the other hand,
and most importantly, this allows the environment to come back
to its “resting state.” This means that the environment has no
memory: after an action has been executed by the robot, all the
objects are back in the same state. For example, if the object
that can be bashed has actually been bashed, then it has stopped
oscillating before the robots tries a new action. This is a de-
liberate choice to have an environment with no memory, while
keeping all the advantages, the constraints and the complexity
of a physical embodiment, this makes the mapping from actions
to perception learnable in a reasonable time. This is crucial if
one wants to do several experiments (already in this case, each
experiment lasts for nearly one day). Furthermore, introducing
an environment with memory frames the problem of the max-
imization of internal reward within delayed reward reinforce-
ment problems, for which there exists powerful but complicated
techniques whose biases would certainly make the results more
complex and render them more difficult to interpret.
D. Results
During an experiment, we continuously measure a number of
features which help us characterize the dynamics of the robot’s
development. First, we measure the frequency of the different
kinds of actions that the robot performs in a given time window.
More precisely:
• the percentage of actions which do not involve the biting
and the bashing motor primitive in the last 100 actions (i.e.,
the robot’s action boils down to “just looking” in a given
direction);
• the percentage of actions which involve the biting motor
primitive in the last 100 actions;
• the percentage of action which involve the bashing motor
primitive in the last 100 action.
Then, we track the gaze of the robot and at each action, mea-
sure if it is looking towards: 1) the bitable object, or 2) the bash-
able object, or 3) no object. This is possible from an external
point of view since we know where the objects are and so it is
easy to derive the information from the head position.
Third, we measure the evolution of the frequency of suc-
cessful biting actions and the evolution of successful bashing
actions. A successful biting action is defined as an action which
provokes a “1” value on the sensor (an object has actually
be bitten). A successful bashing action is defined as an action
which provokes an oscillation in the sensor.
Fig. 8 shows an example of the results of the evolution of the
three kinds of measures on three different levels. A striking fea-
ture of these curves is the formation of sequences of peaks. Each
of these peaks basically means that at the moment it occurs the
robot is focusing its activity and its attention on a small subset
of the sensorimotor space. Therefore, it is qualitatively different
from random action performance in which the curves would be
stationary and rather flat. By looking in detail at these peaks and
at their co-occurence (or not) within the different kinds of mea-
sures, we can make a description of the evolution of the robot’s
behavior. In Fig. 8, we have marked a number of such peaks
with letters from A to G. We can see that before the first peak,
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Fig. 8. Curves describing a run of the playground experiment. Top 3: Frequencies for certain action types on windows 100 time steps wide. Mid 3: Frequencies of
gaze direction towards certain objects in windows 200 time steps wide: “object 1” refers to the bitable object, and “object 2” refers to the bashable object. Bottom
3: Frequencies of successful bite and successful bash in windows 200 time steps wide.
there is an initial phase during which all actions are produced
equally often, that most often no object is seen, and that a suc-
cessful bite or bash only happens extremely rarely. This corre-
sponds to a phase of random action selection. Indeed, the robot
initially categorizes the sensorimotor space using only one big
region (and so there is only one category), and so all actions in
any contexts are equally interesting. Then, we observe a peak
(A) in the “just looking” curve. This means that for a while, the
robot stops biting and bashing, and focuses on just moving its
head around. This means that at this point the robot has split the
space into several regions, and that a region corresponding to the
sensorimotor loop of “just looking around” is associated to the
highest learning progress from the robot’s point of view. Then,
the next peak (B) corresponds to a focus on the biting action
primitive (with various continuous parameters), but it does not
co-occur with looking towards the bitable object. This means
that the robot is basically trying to bite in all directions around it,
it did not discover yet the affordances of the biting actions with
particular objects. The next peak (C) corresponds to a focus on
the bashing action primitive (with various continuous parame-
ters), but again the robot does not look towards a particular di-
rection. As the only way to discover that a bashing action can
make an object move is by looking in the direction of this ob-
ject (because the IR sensor is on the cheek), this means that the
robot does not use at this point the bashing primitive with the
right affordances. The next peak (D) corresponds to a period
within which the robot again stops biting and bashing and con-
centrates on moving the head, but this time we observe that the
robot focuses these “looking” movements in a narrow part of
the visual field, it is basically looking around one of the ob-
jects, learning how it disappears/reappears in its field of view.
Then, there is peak (E) corresponding to focusing on the biting
action, which is this time coupled with a peak in the curve mon-
itoring the looking direction towards the bitable object, and a
peak in the curve monitoring the success in biting. It means that
during this period, the robot uses the action primitive with the
right affordances, and manages to bite the bitable object quite
often. This peak is then repeated a little bit later (F). Finally, a
co-occurrence of peaks (G) appears that corresponds to a period
during which the robot concentrates on using the bashing prim-
itive with the right affordances, managing to actually bash the
bashable object quite often.
This example shows that several interesting phenomena have
appeared in this run of the experiment. First of all, the presence
and co-occurrence of peaks of various kinds shows a self-organ-
ization of the behavior of the robot, which focuses on particular
sensorimotor loops at different periods in time. Second, when
we observe these peaks, we see that they are not random peaks,
but show a progressive increase in the complexity of the be-
havior to which they correspond. Indeed, one has to remember
that the intrinsic dimensionality of the “just looking” behavior
(pan and tilt) is lower than the one of the “biting” behavior
(which adds the depth of the crouching movement), which is in
itself lower than the one of the “bashing” behavior (which adds
the angle and the strength dimensions). The order of appearance
of the periods within which the robot focuses on one of these ac-
tivities is precisely the same. If we look in more detail, we also
see that the biting behavior appears first in a nonaffordant ver-
sion (the robot tries to bite things which cannot be bitten), and
then only later in the affordant version (where it tries to bite the
biteable object). The same observation holds for the bashing be-
havior: first, it appears without the right affordances, and then
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it appears with the right affordances. The formation of focused
activities whose properties evolve and are refined with time can
be used to describe the developmental trajectories that are gen-
erated in terms of stages. Indeed, one can define that a new stage
begins when a co-occurence of peaks that never occurred before
happens (and which denotes a novel kind of focused activity).
We ran the experiment several times with the real robots, and
whereas each particular experiment produced curves which
were different in the details, it seemed that some regularities in
the patterns of peak formation, and in terms of stage sequences
were present. We then proceeded to more experiments in order to
precisely assess the statistical properties of these self-organized
developmental trajectories. As each experiment with the real
robot lasts several hours, and in order to be able to run many
experiments (200), we developed a model of the experimental
setup. Thanks to the fact that the physical environment was
memoryless after each action of the robot, it was possible to
make an accurate model of it using the following procedure.
We let the robot perform several thousand actions and we
recorded each time and . Then, from this
database of examples, we trained a prediction machine based
on locally weighted regression [44]. This machine was then
used as a model of the physical environment and the IAC
algorithm of the robot was directly plugged into it.
Using this simulated world setup, we ran 200 experiments,
each time monitoring the evolution using the same measures
as above. We then constructed higher level measures on each
of the runs, based on the structure of the peak sequence.
Peaks were defined here using a threshold on the height and
width of the bumps in the curves. These measures correspond
to the answers to these following questions.
• (Measure 1) Number of peaks?: How many peaks are
there in the action curves (top curves)?
• (Measure 2) Complete scenario?: Is the following devel-
opmental scenario matched: first, there is a “just looking”
peak, then there is a peak corresponding to “biting” with
the wrong affordances which appears before a peak cor-
responding to “biting” with the right affordances, and
there is a peak corresponding to “bashing” with the wrong
affordances which appears before a peak corresponding
to “bashing” with the right affordances (and the relative
order between “biting”-related peaks and “bashing”-re-
lated peaks is ignored). Biting with the right affordance
is defined here as the co-occurence between a peak in
the “biting” curve and a peak in the “seeing the biteable
object” curve, and biting with the wrong affordances is
defined as all other situations. The corresponding defi-
nition applies to “bashing.”
• (Measure 3) Nearly complete scenario?: Is the following
less constrained developmental scenario matched. There is
apeakcorresponding to“biting”with thewrong affordances
which appears before a peak corresponding to “biting” with
the right affordances, and there is a peak corresponding
to “bashing” with the wrong affordances which appears
before a peak corresponding to “bashing” with the right
affordances (and the relative order between “biting”-related
peaks and “bashing”-related peaks is ignored).
TABLE I
STATISTICAL MEASURES ON THE 200 SIMULATION-BASED EXPERIMENTS
• (Measure 4) Nonaffordant bite before affordant bite?:
Is there is a peak corresponding to “biting” with the wrong
affordances which appears before a peak corresponding
to “biting” with the right affordances?
• (Measure 5) Nonaffordant bash before affordant bash?:
Is there a peak corresponding to “bashing” with the wrong
affordances which appears before a peak corresponding
to “bashing” with the right affordances?
• (Measure 6) Period of systematic successful bite?: Does
the robot succeed systematically in biting often at some
point ( is there a peak in the “successful bite” curve)?
• (Measure 7) Period of systematic successful bash?: Does
the robot succeed systematically in bashing often at some
point ( is there a peak in the “successful bash” curve?
• (Measure 8) Bite before bash?: Is there a focus on biting
which appears before a focus on bashing (independantly
of affordance)?
• (Measure 9) Successful bite before successful bash?: Is
there a focus on successfully biting which appear before
a focus on successfully bashing?
The numerical results of these measures are summarized in
Table I. This table shows that indeed some structural and statis-
tical regularities arise in the self-organized developmental tra-
jectories. First of all, one has to note that the complex and struc-
tured trajectory described by Measure 2 appears in 34% of the
cases, which is high given the number of possible co-occurences
of peaks which define a combinatorics of various trajectories.
Furthermore, if we remove the test on “just looking,” we see
that in the majority of experiments, there is a systematic se-
quencing from nonaffordant to affordant actions for both biting
and bashing. This shows an organized and progressive increase
in the complexity of the behavior. Another measure confirms
this increase of complexity from another point of view: if we
compare the relative order of appearance of periods of focused
bite or bash, then we find that “focused bite” appears in the large
majority of the cases before the “focused bash,” which corre-
sponds to their relative intrinsic dimension (3 for biting and 4
for bashing). Finally, one can note that the robot in 100% of the
experiments, reaches a period during which it repeatedly man-
ages to bite the biteable object, and in 78% of the experiments,
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Fig. 9. Various runs of the simulated experiments. In the top squares, we observe two typical developmental trajectories corresponding to the “complete scenario”
described by Measure 1. In the bottom curve, we observe rare but existing developmental trajectories.
it reaches a period during which it repeatedly manages to bash
the bashable object. This last point is interesting since the robot
was not preprogrammed to achieve this particular task.
These experiments show how the intrinsic motivation system
which is implemented (IAC) drives the robot into a self-or-
ganized developmental trajectory in which periods of focused
sensorimotor activities of progressively increasing complexity
arise. We have seen that a number of structural regularities arose
in the system, such as the tendancy of nonaffordant behavior
to be explored before affordant behavior, or the tendancy to
explore a certain kind of behavior (bite) before another kind
(bash). Yet, one has also to stress that these regularities are only
statistical: two developmental trajectories are never exactly the
same, and more importantly, it happens that some particular tra-
jectories observed in some experiments differ qualitatively from
the mean. Fig. 9 illustrates this point. The figures on the top-left
and top-right corners present runs which are very typical and
correspond to the “complete scenario” described by Measure
1. On the contrary, the runs presented on the bottom-left and
bottom-right corners correspond to atypical results. The exper-
iment of which curves are presented in the bottom-left corner
shows a case where the focused exploration of bashing was
performed before the focused exploration of biting. Neverthe-
less, in this case, the regularity “nonaffordant before affordant”
is preserved. On the bottom-right corner, we observe a run in
which the affordant bashing activity appears very early and be-
fore any other focused activity. This balance between statistical
regularities and diversity has parallels in infant sensorimotor de-
velopment [45]. There are some strong structural regularities but
from individual to individual there can be some substantial dif-
ferences (e.g., some infants learn how to crawl before they can
sit and others do the reverse).
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Developing Complex Behavioral Schemas
We have discussed how to design a system of internal rewards
suited for active and autonomous development. Such an intrinsic
motivation system permits us to realize an efficient active ex-
ploration of a given sensorimotor space. In the experiments de-
scribed, we deliberately considered simple spaces. Enhancing
the complexity of perception and motor spaces seems crucial
in order to expect the emergence of more complex forms of be-
havior. However, designing suitable spaces that can lead to com-
plex behavioral patterns raises several difficult issues.
A first issue is whether perception and motor spaces should
be considered as two independent spaces. The intrinsic links
that bind perception with action have been stressed by many
authors. In some circumstances, relevant information about a
given environment arises from sensorimotor trajectories rather
than from simple analysis of perceptual data. Several experi-
ments have shown that agents can simplify problems of cat-
egorizing situations by actively modifying their own position
or orientation with respect to the environment or by modifying
the environment itself. In the same manner, certain environ-
mental regularities can be detected only by producing a par-
ticular stereotyped behavior (e.g., [46] and [47]). The fact that
perception is fundamentally active, naturally leads to consider
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abstractions like behavioral schemas as relevant unit for under-
standing development.
Schemas are famously known as central elements of Piaget’s
developmental psychology but the term has also been used in
neurology, cognitive psychology, and motor control [48, pp.
36–40], and related notions appeared in artificial intelligence
under names like frames or scripts [49], [50]. In Piaget’s theory,
children’s development can be interpreted as the incremental or-
ganization of a set of schemas. Schemas are skills that serve both
the perceiving of the environment and acting upon it. Piaget calls
assimilation the ability to make sense of a situation in terms of
a current set of schemas, and accommodation the way in which
schemas are updated as the expectations based on assimilation
are not met. The child starts with basic sensorimotor schemas
such as suckling, grasping, and some primary forms of eye-hand
coordination. Through accommodation and assimilation, new
schemas are created, and sets of existing schemas get coordi-
nated. The child makes progressively more complex abstract in-
ferences about the environment, leading eventually to language
and logic, forms of abstract thought that are no longer directly
grounded, in particular, sensorimotor situations. The whole de-
velopmental trajectory can be interpreted as an extension from
a simple sensorimotor space to an elaborated mental space. The
space changes but the fundamental dynamics of accommodation
and assimilation that actively drive the child’s behavior remain
the same.
It is important to stress that schemas are primarily functional
units. In that sense, they are a priori distinct from structural
units that can be identified in the organization of the organism
or the machine that produces the observed behavior. However,
many artificial intelligence models make use of internal explicit
schema structures. In such systems, there is a one-to-one map-
ping between these internal structures and the functional opera-
tion that the agent can perform. For instance, Drescher describes
a system inspired by Piaget’s theories in which a developing
agent explicitly creates, modifies, and merges schema structures
in order to interact with a simple simulated environment [51].
Using explicit schema structures has several advantages: such
structures can be manipulated via symbolic operations, creation
of new skills can be easily monitored by following the creation
of new schemas, etc.
Other systems do not rely on such explicit representations.
These are typically subsymbolic systems, using continuous rep-
resentations of their environment. Nevertheless, such systems
may display some organized forms of behavior where clear
functional units can be identified. Their developmental trajec-
tories can also be interpreted as a progressive organization of
schemas. For instance, the developmental trajectories produced
by the typical experiments of Section VII can be interpreted
as assimilation and accommodation phases. In these typical
runs, the robot “discovers” the biting and bashing schema by
producing repeated sequences of these kinds of behavior, but
initially these actions are not systematically oriented towards
the biteable or the bashable object. This stage corresponds to
“assimilation.” It is only later that “accommodation” occurs as
biting and bashing starts to be associated with their respective
appropriate context of use. Our experiments show that func-
tional organization can emerge even in the absence of explicit
internal schema structures. However, the current limitations of
such a system may appear when considering more complex
forms of behavioral organization such as formation of hierar-
chical structures and the emergence of goals.
1) Hierarchical Organization: Complex behavior patterns
are hierarchically organized. For instance, a complex motor pro-
gram is often described as an abstract event sequence at a high
level and a detailed motor program in a lower level. Therefore,
possibility for forming level structures is a key issue. Different
authors have already tried to tackle how combinations of prim-
itives could be autonomously organized in higher level struc-
tures. Option theory offers an interesting mathematical frame-
work to address hierarchical organization of systems using ex-
plicit schema structures [52]. Options are like subroutines as-
sociated with closed-loop control structures. They can invoke
other options as components. Barto et al. have recently illus-
trated in a simple environment how options could be used to
develop a hierarchical collection of skills [21]. Hierarchical or-
ganization of explicit schemas is also illustrated by the work
of Drescher among others [51]. However, can hierarchically or-
ganized behavior appear in the absence of explicit schemas?
Different attempts have been made in this direction. A mul-
tiple model-based reinforcement learning capable of decom-
posing a task based on predictability levels was proposed by
Doya et al. [53]. Tani and Nolfi presented a system capable of
combining local experts using gated modules [54]. However, in
all these studies, explicit level structures are predetermined by
the network architecture. The question of whether hierarchical
structures can simply self-organize without being explicitly pro-
grammed remains open.
2) Goal-Directedness: Complex behavior patterns are also
associated with intentionally directed processes. This means
that they are performed by an agent trying to achieve a
particular desirable situation that constitutes its aim or goal
(e.g., reducing hunger, following someone, learning something).
The agent’s behavior reflects his or her intention, that is the
plan of action that the agent chooses for realizing this particular
goal. This plan includes both the means and the pursued goal
[55]. Once again, systems using explicit schema structure
embed these notions of goals and means as explicit symbolic
representations. Such explicit goals can be created, updated,
deleted, and more importantly, easily monitored. This has led
to numerous systems in classical artificial intelligence, and
research in this area has influenced the importance of the
way we consider decision making or planning. More recently,
research on agent architectures [56] has put a major emphasis
on the same issues. However, these models do not give much
insight on the developmental and cognitive mechanisms that
lead to the notion of intentionally directed behavior. Can
goals and means simply emerge out of subsymbolic dynamics?
This is one of the most challenging issues that developmental
approaches to cognition have to face [57]. To some extent,
certain reinforcement learning models have demonstrated that
the organization of behavior into goals and subgoals can be
interpreted as emergent features resulting in simpler drives
[37]. However, no subsymbolic systems currently matches
the performances and the flexibility of systems using explicit
goal-directed schemas.
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3) Generalization, Transfer, Analogy: Generalization,
transfer or analogies between schemas are also thought to be
central for the emergence of complex behavior patterns (see
[58] for a general discussion of the issue of transfer in cogni-
tion). Skills do not develop independently from one another.
The ones that have structural relationship bootstrap each other.
In particular, processes of analogy and metaphors are crucial
for transferring know-how developed in sensorimotor contexts
to more abstract spaces [59]. There is an important literature
on how to compare explicit schema structure (e.g., [60]), but
many authors have argued that generalization and transfer of
skills could also be (maybe even more) efficient in the absence
of symbolic representation [61]. This debate bears some resem-
blance with the opposition between localists or distributed kinds
of representation. Systems with explicit schema structures, but
also many subsymbolic systems using memories organized
into local structures (e.g., sets of experts) are called localists.
In this scheme, learning a new behavior schema corresponds
to the addition of a template to an existing set of modules. The
independence of the modules facilitates incremental learning
as each addition does not cause interferences with the existing
memory contents. However, extension to unknown patterns
must be realized with ad hoc processes that specify the way
similarity should be computed. In the same manner, general-
ization across a large set of local representations is intrinsically
difficult. On the contrary, in systems with distributed repre-
sentations, behavior schemas are not assigned to a particular
module but are memorized in a distributed manner (e.g., as
synaptic weights of global neural network). This means that
each schema can only exist in relation to others. Self-organized
generalization processes are facilitated in such context [62].
Developmental trajectories of intrinsically motivated agents
are constrained by many factors. We have briefly discussed
some of the important issues for designing systems capable of
developing reusable, goal-directed, hierarchically organized
behavioral schemas. Investigating the resulting dynamics of the
intrinsic motivation systems embedded in such kinds of more
complex spaces will be the topic of future research.
B. Relation to Developmental Psychology
Our research takes clear inspiration from developmental psy-
chology both conceptually (the notion of intrinsic motivation
originally comes from psychology) and methodologically (anal-
ysis of development in terms of qualitative sequences of dif-
ferent kinds of behavioral patterns). Could our model be inter-
esting in return for interpreting processes underlying an infant’s
development? More precisely:
• Can we interpret a particular developmental process as
being the result of a progress drive, an intrinsic motivation
system driving the infant into situations expected to result
in maximal learning progress?
• Can operant models of intrinsic motivation provide
useful abstraction that address the complexity of infant’s
development?
Some initial attempts have been taken to start answering these
questions. Taking ground on preliminary experimental results,
we discussed in [63] a scenario presenting the putative role of
the progress drive for the development of early imitation. We
argue, in particular, that progress-driven learning could help un-
derstand why children focus on specific imitative activities at a
certain age and how they progressively organize preferential in-
teractions with particular entities present in their environment.
1) Progress Niches: To facilitate interpretation, we in-
troduced the notion of progress niches to characterize the
behavior of our model. The progress drive pushes the agent
to discover and focus on situations which lead to maximal
learning progress. These situations, neither too predictable
nor too difficult to predict, are “progress niches.” Progress
niches are not intrinsic properties of the environment. They
result from a relation between a particular environment, a
particular embodiment (sensors, actuators, feature detectors,
and techniques used by the prediction algorithms), and a par-
ticular time in the developmental history of the agent. Once
discovered, progress niches progressively disappear as they
become more predictable. The notion of progress niches is
related to Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development, where the
adult deliberately challenges the child’s level of understanding.
Adults push children to engage in activities beyond their cur-
rent mastery level, but not too far beyond so that they remain
comprehensible [64]. We could interpret the zone of proximal
development as a set of potential progress niches organized by
the adult in order to help the child learn. However, it should
be clear that independently of the adults’ efforts, what is and
what is not a progress niche is ultimately defined from the
child’s point of view. Progress niches also share similarities
with Csikszentmihalyi’s flow experiences [8]. Csikszentmihalyi
argues that some activities are autotelic when challenges are
appropriately balanced with the skills required to cope with
them (see also [65]). We prefer to use the term progress niche
by analogy with ecological niches as we refer to a transient state
in the evolution of a complex “ecological” system involving
the embodied agent and its environment.
2) Self-Other Distinction: Using this terminology, the com-
putational model presented in this paper shows how an agent
can: 1) separate its sensorimotor space into zones of different
predictability levels and 2) choose to focus on the one which
leads to maximal learning progress, called a “progress niche.”
With this kind of operant model, it could be speculated that
meaningful sensorimotor distinctions (self, others, and objects
in the environment) may be the result of discriminations con-
structed during a progress-driven process. We can more specifi-
cally offer an interpretation of several fundamental stages char-
acterizing an infant’s development during their first year.
• Stage 1: Like-me stance (0–1 m). Simple forms of imi-
tative behavior have been argued to be present just after
birth. They could constitute a process of early identifica-
tion. Some totally or partially nativist explanations could
account for this early “like-me stance” [66], [67]. This
would suggest the possibility of an early distinction be-
tween persons and things. If an intermodal mapping facil-
itating the match between what is seen and what is felt ex-
ists, the hypothesis of a progress drive would suggest that
infants will indeed create a discrimination between such
easily predictable couplings (interaction with peers) and
unpredictable situations (all the other cases) and that they
will focus on the first zone of their sensorimotor space that
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constitutes a “progress niche.” Neonates imitation (when it
occurs) would be the result of the exploitation of the most
predictable coupling present just after birth.
• Stage 2: Circular reactions (1–2 m). During the first
two months of their life, infants perform repeated body
motion. They kick their legs repeatedly, they wave their
arms. This process is sometimes referred as “body bab-
bling.” However, nothing indicates that this exploratory
behavior is randomly organized. Rochat argues that
children are in fact performing self-imitation, trying to
imitate themselves [68]. This would mean that children
are structuring their own behavior in order to make it more
predictable and form “circular reactions” this way [41],
[69]. Such self-imitative behaviors can be well explained
by the progress drive hypothesis. Sensorimotor trajectories
directed towards the child’s own body can be easily dis-
criminated from trajectories directed towards other people
by comparing their relative predictability. In many re-
spects, making progress in understanding primary circular
reactions is easier than in the cases involving other agents:
Self-centered types of behavior are “progress niches.”
In such a scenario, the “self” emerges as a meaningful
discrimination for achieving better predictability. Once
this distinction is made, progress for predicting the effects
of self-centered actions can be rapidly made.
• Stage 3: Self-other interactions (2–4 m). After two
months, infants become more attentive to the external
world and particularly to people. Parental scaffolding
plays a critical role for making the interaction with the
child more predictable [70]. Parents adapt their own
responses so that interactions with the child follow the
normal social rules that characterize communicative ex-
changes (e.g., turn taking). Moreover, if an adult imitates
an infant’s own actions, it can trigger continued activity
in the infant. This early imitative behavior is referred as
“pseudo-imitation” by Piaget [71]. Pseudo-imitation and
focusing on scaffolded adult behavior could be seen as
predictable effects of the progress drive. As the self-cen-
tered trajectories start to become well mastered (and do
not constitute “progress niches” anymore), the child’s
focus shifts to another branch of the discrimination tree,
the “self-other” zone.
• Stage 4: Interactions with objects (5–7 m). After five
months, attention shifts again from people to objects. Chil-
dren gain increased control over the manipulation of some
objects on which they discover “affordances” [72]. Parents
recognize this shift and initiate interactions about those af-
fordant objects. However, children do not easily alternate
their attention between the object and their caregiver. A
progress-driven process can account for this discrimination
between affordant objects and unmastered aspects of the
environment. Although this stage is typically not seen as
imitative, it could be argued that the exploratory process
involved in the discovery of the object affordances shares
several common features with the one involved for self-
centered activities: the child structures its world looking
for “progress niches.”
We have to stress that the system discussed in this paper is not
meant to reenact precisely the infant’s developmental sequence,
and it is not a model of human development. For instance, the
playground experiment focuses directly on the discovery of ob-
ject’s affordances. However, in addition to the developmental
robotics engineering techniques that it explores, we think that
this system, as well as other existing intrinsic artificial motiva-
tion systems, can also be used as a “tool for thoughts” in devel-
opmental psychology. In that sense, it may help in formulating
new concepts useful for the interpretation of the developmental
dynamics underlying children’s development. For example, the
existence of a progress drive could explain why certain types
of imitative behavior are produced by children at a certain age
and stop being produced later on. It could also explain how dis-
crimination between actions oriented towards the self, towards
others, and towards the environment may occur. However, we do
not even imagine that a drive for maximizing learning progress
could be the only motivational principle driving children’s de-
velopment. The complete picture is likely to include a complex
set of drives. Developmental dynamics are certainly the result
of the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic forms of motiva-
tions, in particular learning biases, as well as embodiment and
environmental constraints. We believe that computational and
robotic approaches can help specify the contribution of these
different components in the overall observed patterns and shed
new light on the particular role played by intrinsic motivation in
these complex processes.
IX. CONCLUSION
Intrinsic motivation systems are likely to play a pivotal role
for the future of developmental robotics. In this paper, we have
presented the background in developmental psychology, neuro-
science, and machine learning. We showed that current efforts
in the developmental robotics community are approaching
the construction of intrinsic motivation systems through the
operationalization and implementation of concepts such as
“novelty,” “surprise,” or more generally “curiosity.” We have
reviewed some representative works in this direction, trying
to classify them into different groups according to the way
they operationalized curiosity. Then, we presented an intrinsic
motivation system called IAC, which was conceived to drive
the development of a robot in continuous noisy inhomoge-
neous environmental and sensorimotor spaces, permitting an
autonomous self-organization of behavior into a developmental
trajectory with sequences of increasingly complex behavioral
patterns. This was made possible thanks to the way the system
evaluates its own learning progress, through the combination
of a regional evaluation of the similarity of situations with a
smoothing of the error rate curves associated to each region.
This system was tested in two robotic setups. In a first simple
simulated robotic setup, we showed in detail how the system
works, and provokes both behavioral and cognitive develop-
ment, by looking in detail into the traces of the simulation. This
first setup also showed how IAC can allow a robot to avoid sit-
uations which are not learnable by the system, and engage in
situations of progressively increasing complexity in terms of
difficulty of learning, which leads to a self-organization of the
behavior. This first setup finally allowed us to show that our
intrinsic motivation system could be used efficiently as an ac-
tive learning algorithm robust in inhomogeneous spaces. Some
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
20 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION
currently ongoing work suggests that these results still hold in
high-dimensional continuous spaces. If this is confirmed, this
would allow us to attack real-world learning problems whose
properties of inhomogeneity kept them out of reach of standard
active learning methods so far [33]. In a second real and more
complex robotic setup, we showed how IAC can drive the devel-
opment of a robot through more than one developmental transi-
tion, and thus allows the robot to autonomously generate a de-
velopmental sequence. Conducting these experiments also pro-
vided the opportunity to discuss methodological issues related
to the evaluation of a developmental robot. Indeed, classical ma-
chine learning methods of evaluation, based on the measure of
the performance of a system on a given human-defined task, are
not suited for developmental robots since one of their key fea-
tures is to be task-independent, as advocated by Weng [34]. We
explained that a developmental evaluation should be based on
the monitoring of the evolution of the complexity of the system
from different points of view, since complexity is indeed a con-
cept which is observer-dependent. For example, it is a necessity
to couple a measure of the evolution of the complexity from the
robot’s point of view, and the monitoring of its behavior on a
long time scale using methods inspired from human sciences
and developmental psychology.
We have also discussed the limits of the system as we pre-
sented it in this paper. Indeed, there are two kinds of limita-
tions which will be the subject of future work. On the one hand,
we deliberately made the simplification that what the system
should optimize is the immediate reward ( ). This al-
lowed us not to use complex reinforcement techniques and limit
the biases coming from the action selection procedure in order
to better understand the properties of our learning progress mea-
sure. Nevertheless, this will be a necessity in the future to use
such complex reinforcement learning techniques, since in the
real-world progress niches are not always readily accessible,
and thus comes the problems of delayed rewards. This extension
of our system should certainly be inspired by the work of Barto
et al. [21] who have presented a study which is very comple-
mentary to ours, in which they experimented the use of complex
reinforcement techniques given a simple novelty-based intrinsic
motivation system.
A second kind of limitation which characterizes the current
system is the fact that the sensorimotor space is rather simple,
in particular, from the point of view of representation. It is an
open issue to study how forms of representations more com-
plex than scalar vectors, such as schemas for example, could
be integrated within the IAC system. One of the potential prob-
lems to be solved is if several levels of representations are used:
How can one build measures of learning progress or knowl-
edge gain which are homogeneous and allow the comparison
of activities or sensorimotor contexts which involve different
representations?
Finally, we have seen that even if the primary goal of the
system we presented is to allow the construction of a truly
developmental robot, taking inspiration from human devel-
opment, the system could in return possibly be useful for
developmental psychologists as a tool for thoughts. Indeed,
we explained how it can help to formulate new concepts for
the interpretation of the developmental dynamics involved in
human infant’s development.
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